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A key issue surrounding employer benefit mandates is the incidence on workers through 
wages and employment. In this paper, we address this question using a pay-or-play policy 
implemented in San Francisco in 2008 that requires employers to either provide health 
benefits or contribute to a public option health plan. We estimate the impact on 
employment and earnings for the private sector overall, as well as for high impact sectors: 
retail and accommodation and food services. We develop a novel approach for individual 
case studies by combining both spatial discontinuity in policies and permutation-type 
inference using other MSAs. We find that, compared to control counties, employment and 
earnings patterns in San Francisco did not change appreciably following the policy. This 
was true for industries most affected by the mandate, as well as for overall private sector 
employment. The results are generally robust to inclusion of different control groups, 
county-specific time trends, and varying pre-periods. In contrast to the small effects on the 
labor market, we do find that about 25% of surveyed restaurants imposed customer 
surcharges, with the median surcharge being 4% of the bill. These results indicate that 
while little of the burden of the mandate fell on San Francisco workers, approximately half 
of the incidence of the mandate fell on consumers. 
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1. Introduction 
Employer mandates to provide health benefits have become increasingly popular 
mechanisms for insurance coverage expansion, and are incorporated into many health 
reform proposals, including the U.S. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Mandates 
of this type are popular because they allow policy makers to finance social policy without 
government funds, and in the case of a “pay-or-play” mandate such as the one in the 
Affordable Care Act, raise money from employers to finance coverage expansion. 
Economic theory and past research have suggested that in demographically identifiable 
groups who value the benefit at its cost, the incidence of such a mandate is likely to affect 
workers through reductions in wages or jobs (Gruber 1994, Summers 1989). Wage 
adjustment and employment effects hinge on employee valuation of the benefit and 
features of the labor market, such as the minimum wage or collective bargaining 
agreements. In addition to being of interest at a theoretical level, the impact of an employer 
mandate to provide health benefits is of policy relevance and the likely effect of the 
Affordable Care Act on jobs has been politically controversial (Pear 2011). 
In late 2006, San Francisco enacted ambitious healthcare legislation with a goal of 
attaining universal access to health care for the city’s residents. As part of the initiative, 
San Francisco implemented a “pay-or-play” employer mandate to finance health care for 
residents. This law provides a natural experiment to estimate how the labor market 
(employment and earnings) responds to a pay-or-play mandate.  
Beginning in 2008, the San Francisco Health Care Security Ordinance mandates 
firms with more than 20 employees to spend a minimum contribution per worker-hour on 
health benefits. Employers with 100 or more employees were required to contribute $1.76 
per hour in health spending for each employee in 2008 (with subsequent annual increases 
of about 5%) while for smaller firms between 20 and 99 employees the hourly requirement 
was $1.17 (San Francisco OLSE website 2009). This benefit represented a 13-19% increase 
over San Francisco’s 2008 minimum wage of $9.36, so it is a substantial requirement—
more stringent than the requirements in the Affordable Care Act or the employer “fair 
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share” requirement that began in Massachusetts in 2007. It is similar in magnitude to the 
mandate in Hawaii (although Hawaii is not a pay-or-play mandate). Employers can meet 
this requirement by paying for insurance directly, paying into medical reimbursement 
accounts, or by paying into the city’s “Healthy San Francisco” public option, which offers 
heavily subsidized access to care.1
One problem with case studies of policies affecting few units (in this case, one 
county) is the difficulty of constructing reliable control groups and forming credible 
inference. In this paper, we develop a novel approach to address both of these problems by 
merging recent methodological developments—a spatial discontinuity design, and 
permutation-type inference as developed by Conley and Taber (2011). Thus we include 
plausible local controls (e.g., Card and Krueger 1996, Dube, Naidu and Reich 2007) while 
addressing the problem of improper inference (Donald and Lang 2007). We use a spatial 
discontinuity approach to identify the effects of the employer mandate on labor market 
outcomes, comparing San Francisco to other counties within the broader metropolitan area. 
The Conley-Taber approach to inference uses asymptotic approximations that let the 
number of control units grow large, while the number of treated units remains small. Thus, 
we consider other top 25 metro areas to account for the possibility of differential trends by 
city center and peripheries and to consistently estimate the distribution of the treatment 
effect. 
  Colla, Dow and Dube (2011) found that although more 
than 90% of San Francisco firms with 20 or more employees offered insurance prior to 
implementation of the law, about 75% of firms needed to increase health spending to meet 
the Ordinance’s requirements. The same study found that many firms chose to “play” by 
expanding benefit generosity, but about 18% of firms chose to “pay” into the city’s Healthy 
San Francisco public option for at least some of their employees. The present paper builds 
on this research to estimate the impact of these changes in health benefits on jobs, earnings, 
and cost to consumers over the first 27 months of implementation. 
                                                 
1 San Francisco’s mandate varies from the traditional definition of a “pay-or-play” mandate and the federal 
Affordable Care Act in that the “pay” portion directly benefits the employee and is not general tax revenue. 
The distinction is relevant for the legal question of which mandates are preempted by ERISA. In this paper, 
we use the terms “pay-or-play mandate” and “employer health benefit mandate” interchangeably.  
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In general, we rule out all but small effects on overall private sector employment 
and earnings, even after more than two years of mandate implementation. We also consider 
high-impact sectors such as retail and accommodation and food services, and further 
consider restaurants as a subsector with particularly large treatment intensity. In all cases, 
the point estimates are close to zero or positive, and in most cases the Conley-Taber 
confidence intervals rule out employment or earnings declines of more than one percent. 
While we cannot rule out the null hypotheses of full or no pass-through in the overall 
private sector—simply because the compliance costs across all firms are so low—we find 
that only $0.08 per hour (12% of the industry gap in spending at baseline) is passed through 
to earnings in a high impact sector like the restaurant industry, and we can statistically rule 
out pass-through of more than $0.16 per hour (26% pass-through of the gap). 
The low pass-through to wages in the restaurant industry is likely due to a 
combination of a relatively high proportion of workers close to the minimum wage, and the 
potential for pass-through to consumer prices. In a survey that we conducted of San 
Francisco restaurants, we found many establishments had instituted a specific surcharge (a 
line item on the bill, rather than simply increased menu prices) to cover the cost of the 
mandate. This surcharge—typically around 4% of the bill—could cover the entire required 
health spending level for an average restaurant even if it had zero health spending 
previously. When we take into account that many restaurants already provided some level 
of health benefit spending, restaurant price surcharges are estimated to account for about 
51% of the required spending increases, suggesting substantial pass-through to consumers 
at least in this local service sector. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
economics of employer mandates and the specifics of the San Francisco law, while Section 
3 surveys the existing empirical evidence. Section 4 presents our methodology and data 
sources, and our results are discussion in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.  
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2. The Economics of Employer Mandates 
A simple supply and demand framework is a useful starting point for analyzing the effects 
of an employer mandate to provide health benefits on the labor market (Summers 1989). A 
benefit mandate such as the Health Care Security Ordinance will cause the labor demand 
curve to shift in by the cost of the mandated benefit and the labor supply curve to shift out 
by an amount equal to the value of the benefit to employees. While we may not expect 
nominal wages to fall among previously employed workers (Kahn 1997), in a competitive 
market, the real wage is expected to fall over time through slower wage growth for existing 
workforce and lower wages for new employees.  
The magnitude and timing of the wage change, and the effect of the mandate on 
employment, will depend on workers’ valuation of the mandated benefit. If employers 
choose to pay into Healthy San Francisco, it provides the workers family with access to a 
medical home that coordinates health care delivery in clinics and hospitals in the city. 
Enrollees with incomes under 300 percent of the federal poverty level whose employers 
pay into the program have heavily subsidized access (with waived program fees), and those 
with higher incomes may buy into Healthy San Francisco at rates substantially lower than 
what they would pay for an individual policy in the private-insurance market (Healthy San 
Francisco website 2009). For workers at the minimum wage, there cannot be any wage 
pass-through. At the minimum wage, the joint (employer and employee) surplus from 
paying into the city option is positive for most workers due to the subsidies up to 300% of 
the federal poverty limit. For higher wage workers, who are more likely to have family 
income greater than 3 times the poverty limit, the subsidy (and hence value of program to 
the employee) is smaller due to increased program fees for those with income above this 
level. Therefore, we might expect the largest amount of wage pass-through to occur for 
jobs paying greater than—but not too much greater than—the minimum wage.  
To the extent that workers do not value the benefit at its cost or if the minimum 
wage is binding, the entire cost of the benefit will not be passed through to wages. If a 
wage adjustment is not sufficient to offset the cost of the spending mandate, the total 
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compensation of these workers may rise above their marginal value product, leading to a 
reduction in the number of employees (or possibly a reduction in the hours worked among 
existing employees, but employee fixed costs may make this less likely). Thus, neoclassical 
theory predicts some combination of slower wage growth and decreased employment. To 
investigate the minimum wage floor effect, Table 1 indicates that 18% of San Francisco 
workers earned under $10 per hour in 2007 (compared to 2008 minimum wage of $9.36). 
But using the 2008 Bay Area Employer Health Benefits Survey we further estimate that 
only 3-5% of workers were both paid the minimum wage and did not have health benefits 
in 2007, just prior to implementation of the Health Care Security Ordinance. Thus the 
minimum wage could only impose a constraint on pass-through for a small portion of 
workers, although it could have a larger effect on some highly impacted industries (such as 
restaurants) that have higher proportions of workers at minimum wage and with low 
baseline insurance coverage. Finally, to the extent that there may be labor market frictions, 
we may expect an increase in compensation to reduce vacancies and/or profits in the short 
run, rather than observed wages and employment.  
An additional potential margin of adjustment is in output product prices. 
Particularly in markets where full wage pass-through does not occur, and to the extent that 
the product market is at least partly segmented locally as is the case for local service 
industries, firms may be able to pass the additional labor costs onto consumers through 
price increases. The ability of restaurants to pass through additional input costs to 
consumers depends partly on the price elasticity of demand for restaurants. Estimated price 
elasticities of demand for restaurant food have varied from inelastic (0.18, Brown 1990) to 
quite elastic (1.63, Frank and Bernanke 2003 or 2.3, Anderson 2006). Restaurants have 
many substitutes, including grocery store food, but many of their close substitutes in this 
case (e.g. fast food) would have received the same supply shock, which could allow pass-
through to output prices if the demand elasticities are low enough.  
Finally, there could be general equilibrium effects shifting employment between 
firms. A majority of San Francisco firms with more than 20 workers offered health benefits 
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to some workers prior to the mandate going into effect. These firms were already 
competing profitably with the non-offering firms prior to the mandate. If there are 
employment losses in baseline non-offering firms, some of the baseline offerers may be 
able to profitably expand to capture their business, thus mitigating employment losses in 
the aggregate. 
3. Existing Evidence on Employer Mandates 
To date, only a handful of empirical studies have examined the effect of health insurance 
mandates on wages and employment. Hawaii and Massachusetts are the only states with a 
mandate for employers to provide health insurance, although Massachusetts’ employer 
mandate is fairly minimal at $295 per year and thus should not have substantial labor 
market effects. The Hawaiian Prepaid Health Care Act of 1974 is an insurance mandate 
(without any “pay” option) requiring employers to provide insurance to employees, and is 
thus more similar in magnitude to San Francisco’s health spending mandate. Thurston 
(1997) found that between 1970 and 1990, the Hawaiian industries most affected by the 
insurance mandate had slower wage growth than other Hawaiian industries (but more rapid 
wage growth than the same industries nationally). Buchmueller, DiNardo, and Valletta 
(2009) found that relative wages in Hawaii did fall over a longer time period, but the effect 
was insignificant and the law did not reduce employment probabilities. However, they 
found a greater reliance on exempt workers (such as those working less than 20 hours per 
week), suggesting some distortionary labor market effects.  
There is a larger set of studies that have analyzed mandates that apply to the benefit 
makeup of private insurance packages, rather than mandating the offer of insurance. 
Benefit mandate laws vary from state to state, with a few mandated benefits at the federal 
level. Early cross-sectional wage studies typically found that the presence of health 
insurance increased wages, not supporting the compensating differentials hypothesis (e.g. 
Monheit et al. 1985). However, a key omitted variable in the cross-sectional case is worker 
productivity, which is difficult to fully control for with observables. The most influential 
study on the effect of benefit mandates is Gruber (1994), who used a natural experiment to 
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study the effect of state maternity mandates on wages. He found that demographically 
identifiable affected cohorts (single and married women aged 20 to 40 and married men in 
the same age range) paid the full cost of the mandates through reductions in wages. 
Effects of workers compensation insurance mandates on wages and employment are 
also relevant to the study of benefit mandates. Empirical studies have examined the effects 
of workers compensation mandates on wages and found that most (83-100%) of the 
expected cost was borne by workers in the form of lower wages, and that the reduction in 
wages for employees at small firms could be greater (Gruber and Krueger 1991, Viscusi 
and Moore 1987). In terms of employment levels, Gruber and Krueger also found that 
higher workers compensation insurance costs had a negative but statistically insignificant 
effect on employment, with an implied elasticity of labor demand of about -0.5. Kaestner 
(1996) examined the effect of unemployment compensation insurance taxes and workers' 
compensation insurance mandates on the employment of youths and young adults and 
found that increases in labor costs reduced employment in teenagers, but not young adults. 
A parallel body of research is that of effects of minimum wage laws on equilibrium 
employment levels. Yelowitz (2004) suggests that a health care spending mandate would 
lead to increased unemployment for workers at the minimum wage. However, a body of 
evidence from the minimum wage literature suggests that modest increases in labor costs 
may not lead to noticeable changes in overall staffing patterns (Brown 1999, Card and 
Krueger 1994, Card and Krueger 2000). Dube, Naidu and Reich (2007) found no 
discernable minimum wage impact on employment in the restaurant sector in San 
Francisco. Generalizing the border-discontinuity method, Dube, Lester and Reich (2010) 
estimated the effect of minimum wage changes across all cross-border contiguous county 
pairs over the 1990-2006 period, and found no disemployment effects in restaurants or 
other low-wage sectors.  
Past research indicates that as health costs rise, firms substitute hours per worker for 
the number of workers employed (Cutler and Madrian 1998). However, this effect was not 
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found in Hawaii and may not be applicable in this case given that the minimum spending 
requirements are based on the number of hours the employee works (Thurston 1997).  
4. Data and Research Design 
4.1 Data and Sample Construction  
In order to investigate the effect on jobs and wages empirically, we use the Quarterly 
Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW), which is a near census of the working 
population. We compare employment and weekly earnings trends in San Francisco to those 
of neighboring counties and to other large metropolitan statistical areas in the United States 
that did not implement any comparable new employer mandate. Quarterly data on 
employment and earnings at county-by-quarter-by-industry level were obtained for the 
period between first quarter of 1990 and first quarter of 2010 from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS). The dataset is based on ES-202 filings that every establishment is required 
to submit quarterly for the purpose of calculating payroll taxes related to unemployment 
insurance. Since 98 percent of workers are covered by unemployment insurance, the 
QCEW constitutes a near-census of employment and earnings. Our two primary outcome 
measures are total employment and average earnings. The earnings measure is the average 
rate of weekly pay for workers by industry. BLS divides the total payroll in each industry 
and county in a given quarter by the total employment level in each industry and county for 
that quarter, and then reports the average weekly earnings on a quarterly basis. The QCEW 
does not report hours worked. However, we can partly address the possibility of an hour 
reduction, such as that claimed by the Golden Gate Restaurant Association (Mandelbaum 
2009) by examining weekly earnings. To reduce influence of outliers, we imputed data for 
outliers that were more than four standard deviations away from the mean over the full 
sample period.  
We chose to focus our attention on all private sector (NAICS code 10), as well as 
industries most affected by the employer mandate for the years 2002-2010: Retail 
Establishments (NAICS codes 44-45, 9% of private employment in 2009), Accommodation 
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and Food Services (72, 14% of private employment), and its major subsector Eating and 
Drinking Places (722, 10% of private employment).2 Using data from the 2008 Bay Area 
Employer Health Benefits Survey, Colla, Dow, and Dube (2011) estimated the “gap” 
amount per worker hour that the average firm in each industry would need to increase 
health spending from 2007 to 2008 in order to come into compliance with the minimum 
spending mandate. The gap reflects a combination of a small percent of firms who did not 
offer health benefits at all at baseline, other firms that offered benefits but not to all classes 
of employees covered by the mandate, firms with incomplete take-up of insurance offering, 
and firms whose benefits are not sufficiently generous to meet the per person spending 
mandate. On average across all private industries, firms with 20 or more workers would 
need to increase hourly spending by $0.29 per worker (Table 1). Those in retail (Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) 23, 53, 54, 56, 59) would have to increase their health 
spending by $0.41 per worker-hour, those in Accommodation and Food Services (SIC 20, 
54, 58, 70) would have to increase spending by $0.57, while restaurants (SIC 58) in 
particular would have to increase their health spending by $0.62 per worker-hour.3
Additionally, the industries on which we focus have substantial proportions of 
minimum wage workers, for whom possible disemployment effects may be more of a 
concern since their wages cannot adjust. According to the 2007 American Community 
Survey, in San Francisco approximately 45% of workers in eating and drinking places, 
 The 
additional mandated costs are modest overall, but sizeable in low wage sectors which 
typically provide limited health benefits to employees. In Table 1, we also report these 
additional hourly “gap” expenditures (calculated from 2008 Bay Area Employer Health 
Benefit Survey) as a fraction of wages, using hourly wage by industry in San Francisco 
from the 2007 American Community Survey (Ruggles et al. 2008). 
                                                 
2 We use the terms “eating and drinking establishments” and “restaurants” interchangeably throughout the 
paper. 
3 The gaps presented in Table 1 are smaller than those reported in Colla, Dow and Dube (2011). This is due to 
incorporation of updated information in gap calculations, such as new data on workers who waived the 
required spending due to other qualifying coverage.  
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39% in accommodation and food services, and 26% of workers in San Francisco retail were 
paid below $10 per hour, which is a close proxy for the minimum wage (Table 1).  
We term San Francisco the “center” county and used data on four “periphery” 
counties surrounding San Francisco as a local control group (Alameda, Contra Costa, 
Marin, and San Mateo counties). We similarly constructed center and periphery counties in 
other comparable MSAs based on CBSA definitions for the 25 largest MSAs in the U.S. 
We chose to use the 25 largest MSAs because San Francisco is the 13th largest in the 
country, producing an equal number of MSAs in the sample that are larger and smaller than 
San Francisco. We define a “center county” to be a county that encompasses the urban 
center of the MSA. A list of MSAs, the number of counties by MSA, and definitions of the 
center counties can be found in Appendix I.  
In this paper, we focus on the 2002 to 2010 period. In years before 2002, some 
counties in the dataset did not have data available for the accommodation and food services 
and eating and drinking places industries. In addition, during the 2002-2007 pre-period, 
outcomes in the surrounding counties tracked San Francisco fairly closely, whereas 
considering longer pre-periods led to greater divergence for some outcomes. In a second set 
of specifications, we consider an even narrower pre-period (2006-2007) to reduce the 
impact of time-varying heterogeneity. We do show longer trends for our sample counties 
from 1990 to 2010 in Appendix II. 
In order to account for trends in the housing industry between different areas, we 
control for median housing price and housing sales, contemporaneously and lagged one 
year using data purchased from Dataquick. Originally, 33% of county-quarter observations 
were missing data on sales and 38% were missing median price. We estimated prices using 
median loan data, and then used interpolation and extrapolation from neighboring counties 
to impute missing data elements. We also use population data from the U.S. Census.  
One possible threat to our identification is due to changes in the minimum wage 
between treatment and control areas. The minimum wage in San Francisco increased 
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several times during the years studied, from $8.82 in 2006 to $9.14 in 2007, $9.36 in 2008, 
and $9.79 in 2009. The periphery counties surrounding San Francisco were subject to the 
California state minimum wage, which increased from $6.75 in 2006 to $7.50 in 2007 to 
$8.00 in January 2008. The U.S. minimum wage also increased during 2007-2009. We 
control for the relevant county level minimum wage—based on national, state, and local 
minimum wage data from the Department of Labor. This helps us identify the San 
Francisco mandate effects separately from minimum wage changes. Although they are not 
reported in this paper, our results are nearly identical without including the minimum wage 
controls. 4
 Data on restaurant surcharges due to the Health Care Security Ordinance in San 
Francisco were collected by the authors in early 2009 and early 2010 (details below). In 
addition, the authors fielded the 2008 and 2009 Bay Area Employer Health Benefits Survey 
(details in Colla, Dow, and Dube 2011). Some calculations describing San Francisco 
employers are based on these data. 
  
4.2  Empirical Strategy 
The Health Care Security Ordinance offers a quasi-experimental design with distinct 
control groups: counties in the periphery areas outside San Francisco, and other U.S. MSAs 
of a significant size. Our identification strategy uses the San Francisco policy change as the 
exogenous variation, and considers covered firms that are economically affected as the 
“treatment group.”  We draw control groups from the counties surrounding San Francisco 
                                                 
4 Based on previous work that found no effect of minimum wages on employment using contiguous counties 
(Dube, Lester and Reich 2010, Dube, Naidu and Reich 2007), we do not expect a large bias due to these 
changes. The reduction in labor costs (between San Francisco and periphery) due to a reduced minimum 
wage gap is of a much smaller magnitude than the mandated increase in health expenditures. The minimum 
wage rose by 6.6% in San Francisco between 2006-2007 and 2008-2009 periods. During the same time, it 
rose by 12.3% in the periphery—representing a 5.6% reduction in the relative minimum wage in San 
Francisco. Let us consider restaurants as a particularly high-minimum wage sector, and take the largest 
estimate for the average earnings elasticity of minimum wage in restaurants from Dube, Lester and Reich 
(2010), 0.23. This suggests a roughly 1.3% relative reduction in average earnings among San Francisco 
restaurants from minimum wage policies. However, the additional mandated expenditure due to the health 
mandate represents around 4.3% of the average restaurant wage in San Francisco—suggesting a much larger 
impact on labor costs than from the minimum wage changes.  
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(Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, and San Mateo) and counties from the other 24 largest 
MSAs in the United States. Our main identification strategy uses a spatial discontinuity 
approach:  we compare San Francisco County to adjacent “periphery” counties within the 
broader San Francisco MSA. However, we go beyond a simple discontinuity framework by 
allowing for the possibility that “center” and “periphery” counties within MSAs have 
experienced differential trends. For this reason, we incorporate “center” and “periphery” 
counties within the 24 largest MSAs in the U.S. as additional controls. This approach is 
similar to previous work of comparing contiguous counties to assess minimum wage 
mandates (Dube, Lester and Reich 2010).  
We begin with plotting the ratio of the outcomes between San Francisco and 
periphery counties, as well as the average ratio between centers and peripheries in other 
MSAs (weighted by MSA population) by quarter over the 2002-2010 period. We then 
consider trends in mean outcomes, simple difference-in-differences of mean outcomes, and 
a regression specification with additional controls. In all cases, we show the evidence for 
employment and average wages—for the overall private sector, as well as for specific high 
impact sectors. We calculate a difference-in-differences estimate for log employment or log 
earnings using quarterly data between 2002 and the first quarter of 2010. 
 
Mean outcome  is indexed by MSA m, where m=1 is San Francisco MSA; 
location l which takes on c (“center”) or p (“periphery); and time t, which takes on pre or 
post. So δ1 compares changes over time in San Francisco versus adjacent counties. 
Subtracting the average change in the Bay Area counties from the average change in San 
Francisco County removes biases in second period comparisons between the two groups 
that could be the result from permanent differences or shared trends. 
We also calculate a “triple difference” estimate—which further nets out differential 
growth between center and periphery counties in other MSAs. 
 
Y m,l ,t
 
 
13 
 
The additional term represents the mean employment trends in center versus peripheries in 
major MSAs generally over this period, weighted by population. Here, ωm represents MSA 
m’s share of the total population in the 24 MSAs.  
Our regression specifications use a similar identification strategy by spatially 
differencing all variables, so that for all variables Z, define: 
 
The superscript ∆ denotes spatial differencing between the center and periphery outcomes. 
As above, periphery outcomes  are constructed as population weighted means across 
periphery counties in MSA m. The regression is specified as: 
 
The treatment variable dmt takes on unity when m=1 (i.e., the MSA is San Francisco) and
, µm is a MSA fixed effect, and τt is a time fixed effect. The spatial differencing, 
along with the MSA and time fixed effect sweeps out variation across MSAs, and uses only 
the local differences to identify the policy effect; secondarily, it accounts for arbitrary 
center-periphery trends over this period by using the other 24 MSAs. 
Our vector of controls X represents spatially differenced values of the underlying 
county level controls as described above. The set of controls always includes log of annual 
county-level population, log of minimum wage measured quarterly at the county-level, and 
housing variables that are measured quarterly at the county-level. Housing variables 
include housing sales, housing prices, and 1-year lagged sales and prices. We also always 
include MSA-specific quarter dummies to account for seasonality. In our most saturated 
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specification, we also include MSA-specific linear trends to account for additional long-
term trend differences that may not be captured by other fixed effects and controls.  
We estimate equation 3 separately for each industry, for alternative pre-periods 
(2002 to 2007, and 2006 to 2007), and with and without MSA-specific linear trends. After 
differencing center counties from periphery counties, our model has 825 quarter-MSA 
observations per industry sector. In addition, we estimate a time series version of equation 
3, where we use only within-San Francisco Bay Area variation: 
 
We estimate equation (3) using OLS and report standard errors clustered by MSA. For 
equation (4) we report Newey-West standard errors.  
 In addition to reporting traditional cluster-robust standard errors, we also report 
confidence intervals using Conley and Taber (2011), henceforth CT. This methodology was 
developed for circumstances where only a small number of policy changes are observed in 
the data and standard large-sample approximations used for inference may not be 
appropriate. This approach to inference uses asymptotic approximations that let the number 
of control units grow large, while the number of treated units remains small. As CT show, 
when the number of treated units is small (in our case it is one), the OLS estimate is 
inconsistent even with an unboundedly large number of untreated units. Moreover, 
inference using the cluster-robust standard errors can be misleading even if the number of 
clusters is large. The CT method is related to other recent papers that use a randomization 
or permutation type inference approach (e.g., Buchmueller, Dinardo and Valetta 2009; 
Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller 2007).  
For a given variable Zmt, define 
 
˜ Z mt after partialing out time and MSA fixed effects: 
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Here M is the total number of MSAs, and T is the number of quarters in our sample. Then, 
we can define the CT estimator for the distribution of α from equation (3) as follows: 
 
The key idea behind the CT estimator is that information from other MSAs may be 
used to consistently estimate the distribution of the treatment effect. In our case, since we 
want to use local comparisons, we first spatially difference all variables, and then use the 
CT estimator on these data. We partial out time and MSA fixed effects as indicated by the 
tilde above the variable name. We then regress the residuals from this on a center county 
interaction with the post-period (2008-2010) for each MSA as indicated in equation (5). 
Using these 24 point estimates of the treatment effects, we create a 92% confidence interval 
for the treatment coefficient in San Francisco (given the total of 25 MSAs, this is the 
highest confidence level we can report). Intuitively, the spatial-differenced version of the 
CT estimator allows us to answer the following question:  just by chance alone, what are 
the odds that San Francisco would have seen a certain change in outcome as compared to 
its neighbors?  We can answer this question by comparing the other 24 MSAs center and 
periphery counties, and using this information to form confidence bounds around the San 
Francisco effect. For all specifications with 25 MSAs, we report the CT bounds along with 
the OLS estimate and clustered standard errors.  
5. Findings 
5.1  Descriptive Trends  
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Table 2 provides descriptive statistics over the study period for our outcome and control 
variables in San Francisco, Bay Area periphery counties, control MSA center counties, and 
control MSA periphery counties. San Francisco County is smaller than comparison 
counties, with a higher minimum wage, higher housing prices, and higher wages across 
study industries. A larger portion of private industry is composed of accommodation and 
food services, including restaurants, than comparison counties, while retail makes up a 
smaller portion of private employment.  
Figure 1 provides the first set of evidence on the impact of the Health Care Security 
Ordinance on employment and earnings trends in San Francisco, displaying weighted 
averages of Bay Area periphery counties (our primary control group), the 24 other largest 
MSA center counties, and periphery counties of the other 24 MSAs (our additional control 
groups). We calculate the simple ratio of outcomes in the center county versus the 
periphery counties for San Francisco and the other MSAs in the 2002 to 2010 period and 
normalize to Q4 2007, the last period before treatment. For the most part, Figure 1 displays 
similar trends in San Francisco and periphery Bay Area counties over the pre-period, 
especially so in highly impacted sectors. Moreover, there does not seem to be much of a 
trend on average between center and periphery counties in the other 24 MSAs. These two 
results provide additional support for our research design. When we consider changes after 
the implementation of the policy (i.e., after 2007), we find no visual indication of 
employment or earnings decline after 2007. (Appendix II shows these trends during the 
entire data period available from 1990 to 2010.) 
Table 3 builds on the graphical evidence in Figure 1 by calculating the 
unconditional double and triple difference estimates. We report the employment and 
earnings trends in San Francisco, periphery Bay Area counties, center counties in the other 
24 MSAs, and periphery counties in other MSAs using seasonally adjusted data. The first 
two rows report the average logged earnings and employment in each of these four groups 
in the Pre and Post periods. The third row reports the simple difference between the Pre and 
Post amounts; since those are logs, we can interpret the resulting difference in percentage 
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terms. The fourth row reports the “difference-in-difference” between center and 
periphery—both for the San Francisco Bay Area as well as for the other 24 MSAs; finally, 
the fifth row calculates the “triple difference” by subtracting the latter from the former. For 
example, overall private sector employment in San Francisco was 3.4% higher between 
January of 2008 and March of 2010 (Post) compared with 2002 to 2007 (Pre), while 
employment in the SF neighboring counties (Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, San Mateo) 
shrank by 3.0% compared to the pre-period (Table 3).  
In other MSA counties, employment patterns were slightly negative over this time 
period. Neither the double difference (6.5%) nor the triple difference (7.2%) suggests 
employment loss. Indeed, for all four industry groupings, the simple double and triple 
difference estimates are either small (at most a 0.5% reduction) or positive, pointing away 
from employment or wage loss. Although not shown in the table, all these estimates are all 
indistinguishable from zero at the 90% level. 
5.2  Regression Results 
Table 4a reports the estimated treatment effect (and CT confidence intervals where 
relevant) for log employment in the four industry groups; Table 4b reports analogous 
results for log of average earnings. The first four columns are for the San Francisco MSA 
only, as specified in equation (4). The last four columns are for the 25 MSA sample, with 
the regressions specified by equation (3) with the CT bounds specified in equation (5). The 
specifications also vary by pre-period (beginning in 2002 or 2006) and whether or not an 
MSA-specific linear time trend is included. Although we report the Newey-West (columns 
1-4) and cluster-robust (columns 5-8) standard errors for comparison, we put more weight 
on the CT bounds for statistical inference. Moreover, we refer to column 8 as our preferred 
specification, due to its having the richest set of controls and most immediate pre-period. In 
the presence of time-varying heterogeneity in county employment, inclusion of a longer 
pre-period may be problematic. Because of this we are concerned that the estimates based 
on data going back to 2002 may be more sensitive to mis-specifications, thus we prefer the 
specifications comparing back only to 2006. This preference is further supported by the 
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falsification results in Table 5 discussed below, which reveal several spurious effects in the 
models comparing to 2002, whereas the models with trends comparing only to 2006 
appropriately pass those falsification tests. Moreover, as noted below, specifications with 
linear trends tend to be less noisy than those without. 
As shown in Table 4a, after controlling for (spatially differenced) log of population, 
log of minimum wage, housing controls, time, MSA, and seasonal fixed effects, we did not 
find evidence of a negative employment effect in the four industry groups. Indeed, many of 
the significant employment effects were positive in sign, though they varied in magnitude 
and precision. For the San Francisco MSA only sample, the estimates ranged between -
0.035 and 0.063. For the all MSA sample, the point estimates for employment ranged from 
-0.024 to 0.065. The CT lower bound across all specifications was -0.040. For our preferred 
specification 8, all the point estimates—including high impact sectors—were close to zero, 
and the negative lower bounds were always less than 1%.  
We note that in general, when a linear trend is not included, the CT confidence 
intervals are much wider than those based on conventional standard errors. The CT 
intervals were much smaller (and comparable to conventional ones) when we include an 
MSA specific linear trend, which is unsurprising given the variation in center-periphery 
trends across various MSAs.  
When we turn to average earnings (Table 4b), the range of coefficients in the San 
Francisco MSA only sample ranged somewhat widely between -0.074 and 0.082. However, 
once we account for center-periphery trends using other MSAs, the range narrows to -0.027 
to 0.050. The CT lower bounds are no smaller than -0.041, while for our preferred 
specification 8, earnings reductions are bounded below at -0.008 across sectors.  
To show the data more clearly, Figure 2 displays the San Francisco coefficients 
from specification 8 for the post-mandate period compared to the parallel coefficients 
estimated for each of the other 25 MSAs that are obtained as part of the Conley-Taber 
estimate of 
 
ˆ Γ (a). All coefficients are ranked in an ascending order for each bar graph. 
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Loosely speaking, the coefficient for a given MSA shows the change in center-periphery 
differential after 2007 in that MSA conditional on other controls. For the other 24 MSAs, 
the coefficient can be thought of as the measured effects of “placebo” laws in those MSAs 
that happened during the same time as in San Francisco. If San Francisco employment or 
earnings were adversely affected by the 2008 Ordinance then San Francisco should lie on 
the left part of the bar graph, since none of the other MSAs actually enacted a policy. 
Instead, they are always above the median in terms of employment. For earnings, they are 
either the in lower-middle or upper part of the distribution. Therefore, Figure 2 provides 
graphical evidence of a lack of employment and earnings effects from the San Francisco 
Ordinance. 
Overall, our results provide evidence that over the first 27 months of the enactment 
of the policy, there has not been any discernable reduction in employment or earnings in 
San Francisco. The majority of our regression estimates are positive in sign for both 
outcomes, as are the majority of the simple (unconditional) double or triple-difference 
estimates. These quantitative results are reinforced by the plots of employment and 
earnings differences between San Francisco and neighbors. Using conventional standard 
errors and other MSAs as controls we observe no significant negative effects in highly 
impacted sectors. For some of our specifications the Conley-Taber confidence intervals are 
much wider than those based on cluster-robust standard errors. For our preferred 
specification, Conley-Taber confidence intervals rule out losses of employment or earnings 
reductions of greater than 1% for both overall private sector, as well as specific high-
impact sectors that we consider. Across all the specifications we consider—including short 
versus long pre-period, and with and without MSA specific linear trends—the CT bounds 
rule out earnings or employment reductions greater than 4.1%.   
5.3  Robustness Tests 
We conducted a falsification exercise designed to provide additional information about the 
validity of our research design generally as well as for particular specifications. In 
particular, we change the definition of “treatment” from 2008-2010 to only the year 2007—
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the last year prior to the actual intervention; for all other years the treatment is coded as 
zero. Also, for all non-San Francisco MSAs, the treatment continues to be coded as zero.  
What should we expect from this exercise? If the regression is specified correctly, 
and the null hypothesis is maintained, then the coefficient should be zero. However, if the 
true effect is negative but there is a positive and spurious “pre-trend,” then the coefficient 
should be positive. Conversely, if the true effect is negative, but there is an unusually low 
value in 2007, then the measured effect should be negative. There are other possibilities, 
but these three are the most relevant ones given our measured effects close to zero in 
Tables 4a and 4b. We perform this exercise for all the four all-MSA specifications and for 
the same industries. 
Table 5 shows several patterns. First, we note that none of the employment 
coefficients are statistically significant based on the CT confidence bounds. This is very 
reassuring for our research design. Moreover, the point estimates for our preferred 
specification (the fourth column here, column 8 in Table 4) are very close to zero, which 
again provides additional validation for our choice.  
Second, for earnings, 6 of the 16 specifications are significant using the CT bounds 
at the 92% level. All six of these coefficients are for all private and retail, suggesting 
specification errors may be a concern. Reassuringly, however, for the preferred 
specification 8, none of the coefficients are statistically significant—including retail and all 
private—and the point estimates are generally small in magnitude. 
In addition, we performed a number of further tests (not shown in tables) to check 
the robustness of our results to various changes in specification. After viewing the plots of 
employment and earnings in Figure 1 and Appendix II, we looked into the dip in the ratio 
of San Francisco County earnings to surrounding Bay Area counties in quarter 1 of 2009. 
After examining the data more carefully and speaking with the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
we identified this dip to be the result of a large spike in weekly earnings in San Mateo 
County in the manufacturing sector. We attribute this spike to the buyout of Genentech Inc. 
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by the Roche Group (Genentech 2009). We changed our outlier threshold to be 2.5 
standard deviations from the mean, imputing this observation and found no difference in 
our results (the coefficient on all private earnings in specification 8 changes from -0.003 to 
0.008, both insignificant). We also dropped this observation from analysis and saw no 
change in results, indicating that our results are not particularly sensitive to extreme 
circumstances in a single county or time period.  
Additionally, we estimated regressions including Santa Clara County (another 
county neighboring San Francisco, but which is classified as San Jose CBSA, the 29th 
largest CBSA in the U.S.) as a control, and the results were for the most part similar in 
magnitude and direction (results not shown). The negative earnings effects for all private 
and retail industries in some specifications changed to insignificant or positive.    
 A possible threat to the validity of our research design is the beginning of the 2008-
2009 recession during the implementation of the Health Care Security Ordinance. If San 
Francisco tended to weather a recession better than control counties, and this relationship 
differed from center-periphery recession effects in other MSAs, it would cause us to 
estimate a spuriously small disemployment effect of the Ordinance. However, an 
examination of the figures in Appendix II shows that in the 1990-1991 and 2001 
recessions, San Francisco County had big relative drop in employment compared to its 
neighbors, casting doubt on this alternative explanation.  
5.4  Evidence from Product Markets  
When firms competing locally are all subject to the same mandate, they can also pass on 
some of the costs to consumers via increased output product prices, as discussed in Section 
2. This is particularly the case for restaurants, who primarily serve a local market, and in 
this case all restaurants in San Francisco with 20 or more employees received the same 
input price shock so we might expect to see some rise in output prices. (Approximately a 
quarter of eating and drinking establishments in San Francisco have 20 or more employees 
and 68% of workers in San Francisco restaurants work in restaurants with 20 or more 
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employees, based on our calculations from Dun and Bradstreet and American Community 
Survey data). Indeed, there is widespread anecdotal evidence that some San Francisco 
establishments have instituted a specific surcharge to help defray the added costs of the 
mandate. 
To assess the extent of restaurant price surcharges we interviewed a sample of 
restaurants by telephone in 2009 and 2010 to quantify the prevalence and magnitude of 
health-specific surcharges. Our sample of 340 restaurants was drawn randomly from a Dun 
and Bradstreet database provided by Survey Sampling Incorporated in 2007, consisting of 
establishments in San Francisco with 20 or more employees, and classified as “Eating and 
Drinking Places.”  Of the 340 restaurants which we attempted to contact, we successfully 
interviewed 217 (64%) at least once.5
We investigated the surcharges because they are the most easily measured form of 
pass-through to consumers. Firms that did not impose a line item surcharge may have still 
  We found that 25% of restaurants in our completed 
2009 sample (standard error of 3.7%) and 27% of restaurants in our completed 2010 
sample (standard error of 4.2%) had instituted a surcharge on their bills specifically 
attributed to health benefit costs (these results are not displayed in the tables). Although the 
extent and form of the surcharge varied, most firms reported a charge of 4% on the bill, 
which was the mean, median and the mode for firms using proportional charges in 2009 
(the majority). Larger firms were more likely to institute a surcharge. This could reflect 
imperfect substitutability between products by firm size; smaller firms subject to the 
mandate are less likely to have products that are differentiated from exempt restaurants 
(with fewer than 20 employees). As a result, smaller restaurants that are subject to the 
mandate are less likely to be able to pass the cost onto consumers. 
                                                 
5 We interviewed 142 restaurants in 2009 and 162 in 2010, including 89 interviewed twice in successive 
years. Firms who did not respond in either year did not differ significantly from responders by either number 
of employees or restaurant type (full service, food stand, fast food, lunchroom/cafeteria, caterer, bar/club). 
Among firms who were interviewed in 2009 that we attempted to re-contact in 2010, non-responders in 2010 
(25% of whom reported surcharges in 2009) did not differ from those interviewed again in 2010 (26% of 
whom had reported surcharges in 2009). Thus although the overall response rate is somewhat low, there is no 
evidence that non-response is systematic. Among restaurants interviewed in both years, 85% had concordant 
surcharge reports across the two surveys, suggesting high stability. 
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adjusted their menu prices upwards; we have not investigated this type of response. We 
have, however, been able to use data from the 2008 Bay Area Employer Health Benefits 
Survey to calculate that 68% of the restaurants who have instituted these surcharges already 
offered health benefits in 2007, prior to the implementation of the Health Care Security 
Ordinance. Thus it could be that some firms who wanted to increase prices for other 
reasons did so as a surcharge under the guise of the health mandate, believing that demand 
elasticity responses to health-linked surcharges might be smaller than unexplained menu 
price increases. However, Colla, Dow, and Dube (2011) have calculated that even among 
firms offering health insurance at baseline, most were required to expand health spending 
to meet the mandated spending levels, thus it is not surprising that many restaurants opted 
to raise product prices.   
5.5 Who Bears the Cost of the Mandate? 
In this section we assess the magnitude of estimated earnings and consumer price increases 
relative to the estimated spending increase (“gap”) necessary for firms to come into 
compliance. Regarding earnings, we first note that the QCEW data consist of employment 
and earnings across all firms, including small firms not subject to the mandate, thus 
reported effects in Table 4b are averages across all firm sizes. For example, according to 
County Business Patterns data (Table 1), 68% of restaurant workers are in firms with more 
than 20 employees. Given these parameters and the magnitude of changes necessary in 
these high impact sectors described above (on average restaurants need to increase health 
spending by $0.62 per worker hour, accommodation and food services by $0.57 and retail 
by $0.41 per worker hour), we can rule out complete pass-through of these benefit 
increases to earnings in these high impact sectors. For example, our preferred estimate 
(Table 4b column 8) suggests a 0.4% earnings drop among restaurant workers. This would 
account for just $0.05 per hour (using mean restaurant wage of $13.34 in Table 1), and 
even when attributing the entire drop to the 68% of restaurant workers in firms of size 20 
and above, this would pay for just $0.08 of the $0.62 gap, or 12% pass-through. (Based on 
the lower bound of the confidence interval of the earnings effect in this preferred 
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specification, we can statistically rule out more than a 26% earnings pass-through in 
restaurants.)  The comparable figures for the retail industry and accommodation and food 
services industry are both positive, indicating no pass-through. When considering the 
private sector overall, the gap is lower ($0.29 per hour) and the corresponding pass-through 
is $0.11 per hour (38% of the gap) at our preferred point estimate (though at the lower 
bound of our 92% confidence interval we cannot rule out 100% pass-through).  
The lower earnings pass-through in the restaurant industry likely reflects both the 
greater difficulty in lowering wages in an industry with a large proportion of minimum 
wage workers, but also the greater ability of firms in this sector to pass on costs to 
consumers. As discussed in the previous section, the evidence suggests at least some of the 
cost of the mandate is absorbed as higher costs to consumers. The precise extent of pass-
through to consumers depends on the joint distribution of surcharges and restaurant 
revenue per worker, which we do not fully know, but we can approximate the order of 
magnitude. According to the Economic Census in 2007, in San Francisco, the total sales for 
restaurants were $2.85 billion, while there were 46,873 workers, indicating that the annual 
sales/worker was around $60,780. If we divide this by 1,924 hours per year and multiply by 
4%, we calculate surcharge revenue of approximately $1.26 per hour.6
                                                 
6 In 2007, according to the ACS, the average usual weekly hours for restaurant workers in San Francisco was 
37. 
 This is almost 
exactly the 2008 mandated spending amount of $1.17 per hour for firms with 20-99 
employees (but lower than the $1.76 mandate for firms with 100 or more employees), 
indicating that the average restaurant could fully fund health benefits with this surcharge. 
To calculate overall pass-through, we must take into account that only 25% of restaurants 
reported surcharges, yielding an estimate that surcharges could account for $0.32 of the 
$0.62 spending gap reported in Table 1 for the restaurant sector as a whole. This would 
represent a pass-through to prices of 51% of the gap. This is likely an underestimate, 
however, since surcharges are more common in full service restaurants (and it ignores 
menu prices increases not labeled as surcharges), suggesting substantial pass-through of 
costs to consumers at least in this one local service industry. 
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Each employer’s behavior in passing through costs to employees and consumers 
will vary depending on the extent of that firm’s gap, as well as elasticities of labor supply 
by their workers and demand elasticities for their products and services. Just as consumer 
pass-through is reported by only 25% of firms, it may be that labor market effects are 
concentrated in a small subset of firms as well. To further quantify the proportion of 
employers making earnings and employment adjustments, Table 6 presents self-reported 
behavioral responses by San Francisco for-profit firms in the 2009 Bay Area Employer 
Health Benefits Survey who had 20 or more employees and thus were subject to the 
mandate. Firms reporting wage pass-through (reduced pay raises or bonuses) account for a 
relatively small proportion of workers subject to the mandate (6%), which is consistent 
with the QCEW findings of relatively small pass-through. Interestingly though, firms report 
paying for the expanded health spending in part by reducing spending for other non-
mandated benefits (including dependent health care) for 14% of workers, which would not 
be captured in the QCEW earnings data.  
Table 6 also indicates that firms who reported that complying with the spending 
mandate had some negative employment implications (reduced hours and/or number of 
employees) employed 11% of workers. Such data must be interpreted cautiously, as it 
would be quite difficult for employers to distinguish the effects of the spending mandate 
separately from other labor market forces, including the deepening recession occurring 
simultaneously. It is also possible that respondents’ own political views could have led to 
systematic mis-reporting. Furthermore, the survey did not capture the magnitude of 
employment effects within each firm, nor did it capture general equilibrium effects that 
could have occurred if some firms expanded employment to compensate for shrinking by 
other firms. Nevertheless, the proportion of firms subject to the mandate who reported 
negative employment effects represented a relatively small number of workers, and 
provides further evidence consistent with our QCEW estimates that any negative 
employment effects were minor overall. 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
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Although we should be cautious about inference from a single policy change, the evidence 
thus far suggests that San Francisco employers did not decrease employment or wages 
appreciably in response to the health benefit mandate in the first few years of 
implementation. Adding information from a larger number of control cases in the QCEW 
analysis allows for more robust inference, and indeed rules out all but small negative 
effects. Under our preferred specification, we can rule out reductions in earnings and 
employment of more than 1% across all subsectors we consider. When we consider a 
longer pre-period, we find negative employment effects up to -2.4% in the accommodation 
and food services industry (though not in all private employment), and  a 3% drop in all 
private earnings.  
At our preferred point estimates, tour findings indicate a $0.11 per hour earnings 
decrease in the private sector overall among firms subject to the mandate, which is about 
38% of the required health spending increase. In the restaurant sector the pass-through 
lowered earnings by an estimated $0.08, which represents just 12% pass-through, but we 
estimate another 51% of restaurant costs were passed through to consumers in the form of 
health-specific menu surcharges. Additional pass-through to total compensation occurred in 
the form of reductions in other non-mandated benefits, and further consumer pass-through 
may also have occurred in the form of non-specific price increases, but we are not able to 
quantify their magnitudes. 
While this evidence conflicts with some earlier research indicating that the full 
incidence of benefit mandates was shifted to wages (Gruber 1994), these findings are 
consistent with a recent study of Hawaii’s pay-or-play mandate, which also did not find 
negative effects on overall employment (Buchmueller et al. 2009). However, Hawaiian 
employers may have substituted toward part-time workers (under 20 hours per week) who 
were not covered by the insurance mandate, which is an unlikely behavioral response in 
San Francisco where workers with 8 or more hours per week are covered by the mandate. 
Given that average weekly earnings in San Francisco were estimated to be largely 
unaffected by the mandate, it appears that firms were not reducing the number of hours 
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worked per employee as a response to the mandate. The lack of employment effects is also 
consistent with the literature suggesting that employer cost increases due to related 
minimum wage increases often do not have detectable negative employment effects. In 
fact, San Francisco’s institution of a city-wide minimum wage in 2005 similarly had no 
appreciable impact on employment growth in affected sectors (Dube, Naidu and Reich 
2007).  
Given the apparently incomplete pass-through of costs to employee wages, further 
research on output product price effects would be particularly helpful. It also remains to be 
seen whether the restaurant surcharges we observed will be a lasting feature in San 
Francisco, or whether the surcharge will simply be folded into menu prices. The latter is 
more likely if the surcharge reflects costs of adjusting nominal prices sharply due to 
rigidities. At the same time, if restaurants are utilizing surcharges because they are less 
salient than menu price increases, then this might be an enduring feature of restaurant 
pricing in the city. For example, Chetty, Looney and Kroft (2009) show that shoppers in 
the supermarket largely ignore sales taxes in making purchasing decisions. Since a 
surcharge may appear as a form of tax (as opposed to a higher menu price), it could have 
reduced the impact on consumer behavior. However, if inattention declines over time as 
consumers learn, the efficacy of the strategy will diminish. Finally, at least some 
restaurants have publicized the surcharge as allowing them to provide health care to their 
employees. If consumers are willing to pay somewhat more for “fairness” reasons (like 
purchasing “fair-trade” coffee, or “no sweat” apparel), this could also explain why some 
restaurants have adopted a surcharge. Either way, we interpret the evidence to suggest that 
some firms partly reacted to the health mandate by passing on costs to consumers. Future 
research could analyze menu prices using our longitudinal spatial discontinuity approach. 
While such price increases may be possible in service industries that only compete 
locally such as restaurants, other San Francisco firms competing with firms in markets 
elsewhere may not have latitude for such price increases. Indeed, the health-specific 
surcharges in San Francisco appear to be largely contained to the restaurant industry, as 
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only 2% of other firms report them in the 2009 Bay Area Employer Health Benefits 
Survey. In the long run, with the exception of minimum wage workers, neoclassical 
economic theory predicts that the costs of expanded benefits will be eventually passed on 
to workers in the form of smaller wage increases. This will be of interest to continue to 
evaluate over a longer time horizon, to the extent possible.  
Healthy San Francisco has succeeded in providing health services to nearly all 
previously uninsured residents in the first four years of implementation (San Francisco 
Department of Public Health 2010),7
This evidence indicates that together with private benefit expansions, San Francisco 
is closer to achieving universal access to health care than it was prior to 2008. While 
neoclassical theory indicates that in the long run workers pay for these additional benefits 
either through real wage reductions or lay-offs for low-wage workers, these effects have 
been muted in San Francisco in the first two years into implementation of the employer 
health spending mandate. San Francisco has many unique characteristics that make 
conclusions difficult to generalize (for example geographic location and demographic 
makeup of population), but thus far the Health Care Security Ordinance has expanded 
coverage with little negative impact on the labor market. 
 in part by collecting fees (totaling $34 million in 
fiscal year 2009-10) from employers using the “pay” option under the employer mandate 
(Healthy San Francisco Program Statistics 2011). Little is known still about the extent to 
which these enrollees were drawn from the uninsured versus crowded out of private plans 
(enrollees must have been uninsured for 90 days to become eligible), but it is likely that the 
number of uninsured in San Francisco without access to affordable health care has been 
substantially reduced in the first four years of Healthy San Francisco implementation. 
Colla, Dow, and Dube (2011) found no evidence of crowd-out from firms dropping 
insurance offering in the first year following implementation, based on data from the 2008 
Bay Area Employer Health Benefits Survey.  
                                                 
7 Estimates prior to the introduction of Healthy San Francisco indicated that about 60,000 San Francisco 
residents were uninsured in 2007 and Healthy San Francisco has enrolled 54,312 residents to date (Healthy 
San Francisco Program Statistics 2011, San Francisco Department of Public Health 2010).  
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FIGURE 1 
RATIO OF CENTER COUNTY EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES TO PERIPHERY COUNTIES 
SAN FRANCISCO COUNTY, SAN FRANCISCO PERIPHERY COUNTIES, MSA CENTER COUNTIES, 
MSA PERIPHERY COUNTIES: 2002-2010 
 
 
 
Notes. Figures are normalized to Q4 2007, the last period before treatment. Quarterly earnings and employment data from the 
Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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FIGURE 2 
COEFFICIENTS ON CENTER COUNTY TREATMENT PERIOD VARIABLES FOR ALL 25 MSAS: 
LOG OF EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS REGRESSIONS 
 
 
 
Notes. Bars indicate coefficients on the treatment period (2008-2010) in center counties in the 25 largest U.S. MSAs, compared 
to periphery counties using the Conley-Taber estimator. All outcomes and controls are spatially differenced (center minus 
periphery). The pre-period is 2006 to 2007. These regressions adjust for county population, county minimum wage, housing 
controls, time fixed effects, a linear time trend and seasonal controls.  
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TABLE 1 
SAN FRANCISCO HOURLY WAGE AND GAP IN SPENDING BY INDUSTRY 
 
All Private 
Industry Retail 
Accommodation 
and Food 
Services Restaurants 
Median Hourly Wage $21.63  $16.83 $12.02  $11.08 
Mean Hourly Wage $32.42  $23.38 $14.89  $13.34 
Proportion Earning ≤ $10/Hour 17.59%  26.02% 39.06%  45.11% 
Gap in Baseline Health Benefit 
      Spending and Coverage 
$0.29  $0.41 $0.57  $0.62 
Gap/Median Wage 1.36%  2.45% 4.78%  5.62% 
Gap/Mean Wage 0.91%  1.76% 3.86%  4.66% 
Estimated Proportion of Employees in 
      Firms with ≥ 20 Employees 
75.71%  64.98% 75.48%  68.30% 
       
Notes. Wage data are from the 2007 American Community Survey for all firm sizes (Ruggles et al. 2008). Gap data are 
from the 2008 Bay Area Employer Health Benefit Survey. Preliminary gap calculations are described in Colla, Dow, Dube 
2011. These calculations have been augmented as additional information became available. The proportion of employees 
in firms with ≥ 20 employees is estimated from the 2008 County Business Patterns. 
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TABLE 2 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
2002 to Q1 2010 
 SF Center SF Periphery MSA Centers MSA Periphery 
Mean Population 790,262 3,409,626 1,997,529 2,944,249 
Mean Minimum Wage $8.51 $7.18 $6.33 $6.24 
Mean Housing Price $671,151 $562,511 $234,796 $211,436 
Mean Housing Sales 1,840 3,608 8,448 2,820 
All Private     
Total Employment  450,705 1,251,662 902,167 1,001,598 
Mean Weekly Earnings $1,380 $1,143 $1,011 $834 
Retail     
% Of Private Employment Q1 2010 9% 13% 11% 14% 
Total Employment  43,179 160,534 99,506 142,752 
Mean Weekly Earnings $761 $662 $563 $524 
Accommodation & Food Services     
% Of Private Employment Q1 2010 14% 9% 10% 9% 
Total Employment  62,045 106,900 81,465 88,369 
Mean Weekly Earnings $498 $367 $365 $297 
Restaurants     
% Of Private Employment Q1 2010 10% 8% 8% 8% 
Total Employment  43,805 93,469 68,500 78,583 
Mean Weekly Earnings $413 $345 $331 $281 
 
Notes. MSAs include the largest 25 MSAs in the United States with the exception of San Francisco. MSA center is defined as 
the county that encompasses the urban center of the MSA (see Appendix I). Quarterly earnings and employment data from 
the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, Bureau of Labor Statistics. State and federal minimum wage data from the 
Department of Labor. Annual county-level population data are from the U.S. Census. Housing data are from Dataquick. 
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TABLE 3 
EMPLOYMENT TRENDS IN THE BAY AREA AND LARGE MSAS 
Log of Employment All Private  Retail 
 SF SF 
Periphery 
MSA 
Centers 
MSA 
Periphery 
 SF SF 
Periphery 
MSA 
Centers 
MSA 
Periphery 
          
Post 13.04 12.77 14.00 12.22  10.65 10.70 11.81 10.27 
Pre  13.01 12.80 14.02 12.23  10.68 10.76 11.84 10.29 
          
Diff 3.4% -3.0% -2.2% -1.5%  -2.6% -6.2% -3.4% -2.3% 
Diff-in-Diff  6.5%  -0.8%   3.7%  -1.1% 
Diff-in-Diff-in-Diff    7.2%     4.7% 
 Accommodation & Food Services  Restaurants 
 SF SF 
Periphery 
MSA 
Centers 
MSA 
Periphery 
SF SF 
Periphery 
MSA 
Centers 
MSA 
Periphery 
          
Post 11.09 10.37 11.64 9.84  10.75 10.24 11.48 9.75 
Pre 11.02 10.31 11.60 9.79  10.66 10.18 11.44 9.69 
          
Diff 7.2% 5.5% 4.0% 5.3%  9.1% 6.6% 4.8% 5.9% 
Diff-in-Diff  1.7%  -1.2%   2.5%  -1.0% 
Diff-in-Diff-in-Diff    2.9%     3.6% 
          
Log of Earnings All Private  Retail 
 SF SF 
Periphery 
MSA 
Centers 
MSA 
Periphery 
 SF SF 
Periphery 
MSA 
Centers 
MSA 
Periphery 
          
Post 7.24 7.03 6.88 6.74  6.61 6.42 6.29 6.23 
Pre 7.22 7.02 6.87 6.74  6.64 6.51 6.35 6.30 
          
Diff 2.2% 1.1% 1.1% -0.4%  -3.2% -8.8% -6.5% -6.8% 
Diff-in-Diff  1.0%  1.5%   5.6%  0.2% 
Diff-in-Diff-in-Diff    -0.5%     5.4% 
  Accommodation & Food Services  Restaurants 
 SF SF 
Periphery 
MSA 
Centers 
MSA 
Periphery 
SF SF 
Periphery 
MSA 
Centers 
MSA 
Periphery 
          
Post 6.23 5.88 5.88 5.73  6.03 5.83 5.79 5.68 
Pre 6.21 5.89 5.88 5.74  6.02 5.84 5.79 5.69 
          
Diff 1.9% -1.1% -0.5% -1.2%  1.2% -0.3% -0.4% -0.5% 
Diff-in-Diff  3.0%  0.7%   1.5%  0.1% 
Diff-in-Diff-in-Diff    2.2%     1.4% 
 
 
Notes. Post is January 2008 to March 2010. Pre is January 2002 to December 2007. Diff refers to the difference (Post – Pre) in 
each of the four geographic groups. Diff-in-Diff is Diff of center minus Diff of periphery, in SF and other MSAs. Diff-in-Diff-in-
Diff is Diff-in-Diff of SF minus Diff-in-Diff of Other MSAs. Multi-county estimates are weighted by county population. 
Earnings refer to average weekly earnings. All series are seasonally adjusted. Original quarterly data is from the Quarterly 
Census of Employment and Wages, Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
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TABLE 4A 
THE EFFECT OF SAN FRANCISCO HEALTH CARE SECURITY ORDINANCE ON EMPLOYMENT 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log of Employment 
All Private          
Employment Effect 0.063 0.051 0.060 0.025 0.065 0.048 0.019 0.003 
Conventional SE (0.003) (0.006) (0.014) (0.002) (0.009) (0.013) (0.016) (0.007) 
92% CT Lower Bound . . . . 0.029 0.019 0.007 -0.001 
92% CT Upper Bound . . . . 0.130 0.111 0.045 0.008 
Retail         
Employment Effect 0.033 0.050 -0.005 0.016 0.031 0.022 -0.003 0.002 
Conventional SE (0.009) (0.015) (0.008) (0.004) (0.012) (0.021) (0.019) (0.008) 
92% CT Lower Bound . . . . -0.028 -0.017 -0.019 -0.003 
92% CT Upper Bound . . . . 0.138 0.070 0.027 0.014 
Accommodation & Food Services        
Employment Effect 0.021 0.003 0.009 -0.035 0.004 -0.005 -0.024 0.007 
Conventional SE (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.020) (0.009) 
92% CT Lower Bound . . . . -0.039 -0.026 -0.040 0.001 
92% CT Upper Bound . . . . 0.088 0.026 -0.005 0.015 
Restaurants         
Employment Effect 0.022 0.002 0.018 0.002 0.008 0.003 -0.001 0.003 
Conventional SE (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.010) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) 
92% CT Lower Bound . . . . -0.036 -0.015 -0.015 -0.002 
92% CT Upper Bound . . . . 0.108 0.044 0.019 0.010 
Controls:         
San Francisco MSA Only Y Y Y Y     
Pre-period 2002-2007 Y  Y  Y  Y  
Pre-period 2006-2007  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Linear Time Trend   Y Y   Y Y 
 
Notes. Employment effects are the regression coefficients α associated with the treatment dummy, and outcomes and controls in 
all regressions are spatially differenced (center minus periphery). All regressions include MSA fixed effects, quarter fixed effects, 
minimum wage controls, population controls, seasonal controls, and housing controls including sales and price variables and one 
year lags. Confidence intervals are calculated using the Conley-Taber estimator. Conventional standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. In specifications 1-4 conventional standard errors are heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust (7 quarter lag 
structure). In specifications 5-8 conventional standard errors are clustered at the MSA level. Quarterly employment and earnings 
data is from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, Bureau of Labor Statistics. County population estimates from the 
U.S. Census. Housing data is from Dataquick. 
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TABLE 4B 
THE EFFECT OF SAN FRANCISCO HEALTH CARE SECURITY ORDINANCE ON EARNINGS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log of Earnings 
All Private          
Earnings Effect 0.006 -0.040 0.059 0.004 -0.014 -0.012 -0.027 -0.003 
Conventional SE (0.005) (0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.005) 
92% CT Lower Bound . . . . -0.039 -0.034 -0.038 -0.007 
92% CT Upper Bound . . . . 0.023 0.015 -0.005 0.004 
Retail         
Earnings Effect 0.031 -0.053 -0.005 -0.074 0.037 0.050 0.036 0.015 
Conventional SE (0.008) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) 
92% CT Lower Bound . . . . 0.011 0.026 0.020 0.008 
92% CT Upper Bound . . . . 0.077 0.100 0.058 0.028 
Accommodation & Food Services        
Earnings Effect 0.033 0.056 0.019 0.082 0.019 0.023 0.016 0.021 
Conventional SE (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.007) 
92% CT Lower Bound . . . . -0.018 -0.013 0.000 0.016 
92% CT Upper Bound . . . . 0.077 0.052 0.029 0.029 
Restaurants         
Earnings Effect 0.012 -0.026 -0.008 -0.024 0.007 -0.004 -0.016 -0.004 
Conventional SE (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.008) (0.007) (0.012) (0.007) 
92% CT Lower Bound . . . . -0.041 -0.029 -0.029 -0.008 
92% CT Upper Bound . . . . 0.087 0.030 -0.001 0.009 
Controls         
San Francisco MSA Only Y Y Y Y     
Pre-period 2002-2007 Y  Y  Y  Y  
Pre-period 2006-2007  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Linear Time Trend   Y Y   Y Y 
 
Notes. Earnings effects are the regression coefficients α associated with the treatment dummy, and outcomes and controls in all 
regressions are spatially differenced (center minus periphery). All regressions include MSA fixed effects, quarter fixed effects, 
minimum wage controls, population controls, seasonal controls, and housing controls including sales and price variables and one 
year lags. Confidence intervals are calculated using the Conley-Taber estimator. Conventional standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. In specifications 1-4 conventional standard errors are heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust (7 quarter lag 
structure). In specifications 5-8 conventional standard errors are clustered at the MSA level. Quarterly employment and earnings 
data are from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, Bureau of Labor Statistics. County population estimates from the 
U.S. Census. Housing data are from Dataquick. 
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TABLE 5 
FALSIFICATION EXERCISE – “TREATMENT PERIOD” OF 2007 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Log of Employment  Log of Earnings 
All Private           
"Treatment" Effect 0.018 -0.013 -0.001 0.001  0.026 0.012 0.023 -0.002 
Conventional SE (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.009) 
92% CT Lower Bound -0.003 -0.038 -0.020 -0.011  0.006 0.000 0.007 -0.010 
92% CT Upper Bound 0.076 0.007 0.026 0.028  0.049 0.037 0.042 0.011 
Retail . . . .  . . . . 
"Treatment" Effect 0.019 0.000 0.005 0.006  -0.031 -0.050 -0.045 -0.030 
Conventional SE (0.011) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006)  (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) 
92% CT Lower Bound -0.013 -0.017 -0.020 -0.010  -0.059 -0.070 -0.068 -0.054 
92% CT Upper Bound 0.084 0.036 0.032 0.049  -0.001 -0.008 -0.018 0.004 
Accommodation & Food Services        
"Treatment" Effect -0.002 -0.007 0.002 -0.001  -0.013 -0.030 -0.020 -0.014 
Conventional SE (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)  (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) 
92% CT Lower Bound -0.029 -0.020 -0.013 -0.012  -0.043 -0.048 -0.039 -0.024 
92% CT Upper Bound 0.060 0.017 0.033 0.031  0.021 0.003 0.012 0.003 
Restaurants . . . .  . . . . 
"Treatment" Effect -0.006 -0.013 -0.002 -0.003  -0.005 -0.019 -0.006 -0.007 
Conventional SE (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009)  (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
92% CT Lower Bound -0.034 -0.030 -0.018 -0.019  -0.025 -0.034 -0.022 -0.023 
92% CT Upper Bound 0.066 0.013 0.027 0.031  0.023 0.010 0.020 0.012 
Controls          
Pre-period 2002-2007 Y  Y   Y  Y  
Pre-period 2006-2007  Y  Y   Y  Y 
Linear Time Trend   Y Y    Y Y 
 
Notes. Employment effects are the regression coefficients associated with a SF*2007 indicator, and outcomes and controls in all 
regressions are spatially differenced (Center minus Periphery). All regressions include MSA fixed effects, quarter fixed effects, 
minimum wage controls, population controls, seasonal controls, and housing controls including sales and price variables and one 
year lags. Confidence intervals are calculated using the Conley-Taber estimator. Heteroscedasticy robust standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the MSA level. Quarterly employment and earnings data are from the Quarterly Census of 
Employment and Wages, Bureau of Labor Statistics. County population estimates from the U.S. Census. Housing data are from 
Dataquick. 
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TABLE 6 
EMPLOYER SELF-REPORTED EMPLOYMENT AND COMPENSATION RESPONSES TO  
THE HEALTH CARE SECURITY ORDINANCE 
Reduced employee pay raises or bonuses 6.0% 
Reduced health benefits for some employees 3.4% 
Reduced employer contribution health benefits for dependents 6.0% 
Reduced other employee benefit spending 4.6% 
    Reduced any of the above four dimensions of compensation  14.0% 
  
Reduced number of employees 8.8% 
Reduced hours worked for some employees 8.1% 
   Reduced employees or hours 10.9% 
  
   Any of the above changes in compensation or employment 19.8% 
 
Notes:  Reported percentages are weighted by firm size to reflect the proportion of employees affected  
by each employer response. The data are from 2009 Bay Area Employer Health Benefits Survey. 
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Appendix I: MSA Definitions 
  Number 
of 
 Rank 
by 
 
Center  Center 
MSA  Counties  Size  City  County 
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA   28  8  Atlanta  Fulton 
Baltimore-Towson, MD   7  19  Baltimore  Baltimore 
Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH   7  10  Boston  Suffolk 
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI   14  3  Chicago  Cook 
Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-IN   15  23  Cincinnati  Hamilton  
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH   5  25  Cleveland  Cuyahoga  
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX   12  4  Dallas  Dallas 
Denver-Aurora-Broomfield, CO   11  20  Denver  Denver 
Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI   6  11  Detroit  Wayne 
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX   10  6  Houston  Harris 
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, 
CA  
 2  2  Los 
Angeles 
 Los Angeles 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano 
Beach, FL 
 3  7  Miami  Miami-Dade 
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, 
MN-WI 
 13  16  Minneapolis  Hennepin  
New York-Northern New Jersey-Long 
Island, NY-NJ-PA 
 23  1  New York  New York 
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, 
PA-NJ-DE-MD 
 11  5  Philadelphia  Philadelphia 
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ   2  12  Phoenix  Maricopa  
Pittsburgh, PA   7  21  Pittsburgh  Allegheny  
Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-
WA 
 7  22  Portland  Multnomah  
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, 
CA  
 2  14  Riverside  Riverside 
Sacramento--Arden-Arcade--
Roseville, CA 
 4  24  Sacramento  Sacramento  
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA  5  13  San Francisco  San Francisco 
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA  3  15  Seattle  King  
St. Louis, MO-IL   17  17  St. Louis  St. Louis  
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL   4  18  Tampa  Hillsborough  
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, 
DC-VA-MD-WV 
 22  9  Washington  District of 
Columbia 
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Appendix II: Trends in Employment and Wages in San Francisco County, San Francisco 
Periphery Counties, MSA Center Counties, MSA Periphery Counties: 1990-
2010 
 
 
Note: Figures are normalized to Q4 2007, the last period before treatment. 
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
110%
120%
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
All Private Employment
24 Largest U.S. MSAs - Peripheral Counties 24 Largest U.S. MSAs - Center Counties
San Francisco - Peripheral Counties San Francisco County
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
110%
120%
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Retail Employment
24 Largest U.S. MSAs - Peripheral Counties 24 Largest U.S. MSAs - Center Counties
San Francisco - Peripheral Counties San Francisco County
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
110%
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Food & Accommodation Employment
24 Largest U.S. MSAs - Peripheral Counties 24 Largest U.S. MSAs - Center Counties
San Francisco - Peripheral Counties San Francisco County
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
110%
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Restaurant Employment
24 Largest U.S. MSAs - Peripheral Counties 24 Largest U.S. MSAs - Center Counties
San Francisco - Peripheral Counties San Francisco County
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
110%
120%
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
All Private Earnings
24 Largest U.S. MSAs - Peripheral Counties 24 Largest U.S. MSAs - Center Counties
San Francisco - Peripheral Counties San Francisco County
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
110%
120%
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Retail Earnings
24 Largest U.S. MSAs - Peripheral Counties 24 Largest U.S. MSAs - Center Counties
San Francisco - Peripheral Counties San Francisco County
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
110%
120%
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Food & Accommodation Earnings
24 Largest U.S. MSAs - Peripheral Counties 24 Largest U.S. MSAs - Center Counties
San Francisco - Peripheral Counties San Francisco County
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
110%
120%
130%
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Restaurant Earnings
24 Largest U.S. MSAs - Peripheral Counties 24 Largest U.S. MSAs - Center Counties
San Francisco - Peripheral Counties San Francisco County
